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We consider the use of aspect-oriented techniques as a flexible way to deal with security policies in
distributed systems. Recent work suggests to use aspects for analysing the future behaviour of pro-
grams and to make access control decisions based on this; this gives the flavour of dealing with infor-
mation flow rather than mere access control. We show in this paper that it is beneficial to augment this
approach with history-based components as is the traditional approach in reference monitor-based
approaches to mandatory access control. Our developments are performed in an aspect-oriented
coordination language aiming to describe the Bell-LaPadula policy as elegantly as possible. Fur-
thermore, the resulting language has the capability of combining both history- and future-sensitive
policies, providing even more flexibility and power.
1 Introduction
Distributed Systems are designed to manage large amounts of information, so they must be secured [9]
to provide confidentiality for the information managed by them. The emerging Aspect-Orientation [1]
field has been targeted to some security approaches [8]. Recently, a framework named AspectKB [7] has
been proposed, with which is possible to model process calculi-like distributed systems and to capture
security properties in a realistic way, attaching security policies to each location and then combining the
relevant security policies when an interaction between locations takes place.
The way of expressing security policies in the AspectKB framework refers to the traditional non-
distributed information-flow [11] style of assuring security, which statically analyses the possible be-
haviours of the system in order to avoid any potential misuse in the future. In AspectKB, this is ex-
ploited by making access control decisions dynamically, yet not considering any state of the locations
but possibly some potential future behaviour.
In this paper, we shall consider a multilevel access control policy [6], the Bell-LaPadula model [2],
and show some complications when trying to capture such a policy in a distributed framework in gen-
eral, and in particular in a framework whose security policies focus on looking to the future, since such
multilevel policies are better suited for past analysis of how the system reached its current state.
We then propose an extension to the AspectKB framework, allowing to express also policies that
look to the past. We do this by adding the notion of a localised state to the locations modelled in the
extended framework and allowing the security policies to access those states to make their decisions.
With this, multilevel policies as the Bell-LaPadula policy can be easily captured, and we show how.
Since the original AspectKB framework was already intended to combine different security policies,
with the extension done in this paper both policies that look to the past and policies that look to the future
can be expressed and even combined. This not only benefits when trying to capture specific policies (such
as the Bell-LaPadula one), but it also allows us to model every policy in its original way, providing more
flexibility to the resulting extended framework.
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Moreover, we shall argue that for some situations, expressing a policy in its original way could more
precisely capture what is intended, and this insight would mean that our extended framework is more
powerful as well. We shall start discussing this latter issue in the remainder of this Section (Subsection
1.1). In Section 2 we present a review of the Bell-LaPadula policy in its original formulation, and then
we assess the challenges of adapting it to a distributed setting. Section 3 gives a brief review of the Logic
used for dealing with the combination of policies. In Section 4 we present our extended framework, and
show how to precisely capture the Bell-LaPadula policy. We also discuss why the resulting framework
is more flexible than the existing one. In Section 5 we conclude.
1.1 Limitations of looking to the future
The framework we shall be dealing with throughout this paper is the formal language AspectKB. In that
framework, which follows a process algebraic approach, the processes are modelled as actions taking
place in specific locations, and interacting with other locations modelled as well. Furthermore, security
policies can also be modelled, following an aspect-oriented manner. The policies can express their
intentions by analysing the continuation (namely the process after the current action) of the involved
processes, so that it is possible to know in advance what a process might do in the future. This reflects
an information-flow style of providing security.
However, this information-flow style is not as adequate as it was for sequential programs. Indeed,
since the only process that can be statically analysed is the one that continues after the current action,
all the possible outcomes that may occur due to other processes could not be predicted. This means
that, when deciding whether to allow the interaction to happen or not, it is necessary to look to the
future of just one process, and this can lead to two possible ways of obtaining imprecise decisions, either
over-approximation or under-approximation.
For understanding what over-approximation is, let us assume we pessimistically expect that a partic-
ular action done by a process could, because of other processes we do not know about, lead to an insecure
state. In this situation we may disallow the process to execute that action, but in some cases there might
be no other process performing anything that would lead to an insecure state.
For understanding what under-approximation is, let us assume we optimistically expect that a partic-
ular action done by a process will not lead to an insecure state because the very same process will not
perform another related action that leads to such a state. In this situation we may allow the process to
execute that action, but in some cases there might be some other process that makes the system reach
some insecure state, due to some interactions that could have been avoided if the action was disallowed.
Let us discuss a simple example, without going into syntactic and semantic details, but still thinking
about distributed processes and policies.
Let us think about a security policy where we have different security levels, and every location is
assigned to some level. We do not want any information to be leaked from any security level to lower
ones. Then, we should allow a process, running in a given location, to read data from another location,
as long as the following two conditions are met: first, the other location, where the data is right now, is
in a security level not higher than the one where the process is running; second, the process will not try,
in the future, to write information to locations with security levels lower than the level of the location
where the data is right now, since this writing may be influenced by the reading previously done.
Let us assume now a particular situation where we have 4 locations (say A,B,C and D), and 3 security
levels (say 1, 2 and 3). Let us assume the security levels are ordered as their values in natural numbers
(3 > 2 > 1). Let us assume that location A is in security level 1, locations B and C are both in security
level 2, and location D is in security level 3. Figure 1 contains three cases of such a situation, showing
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Figure 1: Examples of situations that might happen.
the locations and their security levels in different layers.
Illustrated in Figure 1a, there is a process in location D, that tries to read information from location
B at t1, and then tries to write some information to location A at t2. This process should clearly be
forbidden, because it does not meet the second condition of the policy we are trying to capture (although
it meets the first one). Of course this can be done following the information-flow approach, looking to
the future at t1, since we know that the process trying to read from B will try to write to A, and this should
not be allowed.
However, let us think about another case, illustrated in Figure 1b. Let us say that the process running
in location D whose first action is to read information from location B at t1 then tries to write some
information to location C (in the same level as B) at t2. This does meet the second condition of the
policy, since the only information the process could write to C is what it has read from B. Therefore, this
should be allowed.
But let us consider the next extension to the example, illustrated in Figure 1c. Assume there is a fifth
location E that is in security level 3. Assume there is a process running in E that writes some information
to D at t2, after the process running in D has read from B at t1. In this case, the future writing to C by
the process running in D (which in this case will be done at t3) should be forbidden, because it might be
influenced by the new information learned by location D at t2. Anyway, since the process that writes to
C is not the same as the one running in D, the process algebraic way of modelling does not permit us to
know in advance (at t1) that this will happen. If we had taken an approach of looking to the past, then we
would have checked the insecure operation of writing to C right in the moment of the writing (at t3), and
we would have known that some information from E would be leaked, and therefore we would avoid the
write operation.
We could take the information-flow approach using over-approximation, and always avoid this type
of write operation (e.g. from D to C, since the former is in level 3 while the latter in level 2), but
that would be very imprecise (and restrictive), since sometimes there is nothing insecure in doing this
write operation, as shown in the case of Figure 1b. Taking the information-flow approach using under-
approximation would mean allowing the process in D to perform the read and the subsequent write, since
that write operation is not insecure. This will be secure enough in the case of Figure 1b, but not in the
case of Figure 1c.
So, we have found some possible situations where using an information-flow approach in a dis-
tributed setting is not completely precise, and therefore another approach might be taken, for instance
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looking to the past. In the rest of this work, we shall be studying how to deal with looking to the past,
and how to extend our distributed-systems framework to achieve this. We shall see that the resulting
framework allows us to combine both approaches, therefore obtaining the advantages of both of them. In
particular, we shall see that the simple example we have seen is just one possible instance of something
that can easily (and more precisely) be captured by the Bell-LaPadula policy.
2 Assessment of the Bell-LaPadula model
In Subsection 1.1 we saw that for distributed systems the information-flow approach is not as adequate
as it was for sequential programs. In this Section, we review another approach, the Bell-LaPadula (BLP
for short) policy, and discuss the challenges of using it in a distributed setting, but aiming to show that
this can be as adequate as in its original formulation.
2.1 The Operating System view of BLP
The BLP model is the most traditional Mandatory Access Control model. Here we briefly introduce it,
inspired by [6], abstracting some unnecessary details that do not contribute to our study.
State. The computer system will be checked for security by looking into its state. For representing it,
some sets must be introduced:
• S is the set of subjects that may use the information stored in the system,
• O is the set of objects (pieces of information) stored in the system,
• A = {read,write} is the set of operations a subject may do over an object,
• L is a lattice of security levels.
Every state of the system is composed of a set of tuples of the form (s,o,a) (each tuple would mean that
subject s is doing an a operation over object o), and of a tuple of functions ( fS, fC, fO) with types S→ L,
S→ L and O→ L. The functions are supposed to be total functions, and they will give, respectively,
the maximum security level a subject can have (its clearance), the current security level a subject has1,
and the security level an object has (its classification). Formally, a state (B,F) ∈B×F , where F =
( fS, fC, fO), and where:
• B = P(S×O×A)
• F = (S→ L)× (S→ L)× (O→ L)
Policies. The BLP model specifies two properties that every state should meet in order to be considered
secure.
• ss-property2. A state (B,F) satisfies this property iff ∀(s,o,a)∈ B : a= read =⇒ fS(s)≥ fO(o).
This means that each object being read by a subject should be in a level not higher than the level
the subject is able to reach, which is usually called no read-up.
1A subject can log into the system with a lower security level than its corresponding clearance. Once it did so, that security
level cannot be changed until it logs in again.
2For “simple security”.
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• ?-property3. This property consists of two parts. A state (B,F) satisfies the first part (let us name
it ?-property.1) of this property iff ∀(s,o,a) ∈ B : a = write =⇒ fO(o) ≥ fC(s). This means
that each object being written by a subject should be in a level not lower than the level the subject
is currently in, which is usually called no write-down. On the other side, a state (B,F) satisfies
the second part (let us name it ?-property.2) of this property iff ∀(s,o,a) ∈ B : a = write =⇒
[∀(s,o′,a′)∈ B : a′ = read =⇒ fO(o)≥ fO(o′)]. This means that if a specific subject (note the use
of the same s in both quantifications) is operating with many objects, some being read and some
being written, then no object being read could be in a higher level than any object being written.
This prevents the subject to read some high-level object and then write a low-level one.
A state is said to be secure if it satisfies both properties.
2.2 The challenges of distribution
The BLP model was originally meant for Operating Systems. These have a particular feature: they are
centralised, meaning that a central controller (i.e. the Operating System) takes care of everything that
happens in the system. In particular it can control (and in some cases restrict) the processes that try to
access resources. Moreover, one key concept needed for checking BLP policy compliance is the state,
and since Operating Systems have a centralised state, they can do the calculations for knowing whether
the BLP policy is met or not.
Lack of central controller. In a distributed setting we do not have any central controller; many lo-
cations run in parallel and share information, but no location can know what other locations are doing.
Therefore, once a location is allowed access to some resource, there is no way other locations can forbid
it from doing whatever it wants with the resource. In particular, there is no notion of state, processes
interact and synchronise, but no central entity knows what has happened in the whole system so far.
It should be clear that a distributed framework is not trivially able to meet security properties that were
originally developed for simpler systems, as for example centralised ones or sequential programs. In the
case of Information-Flow approach, we have seen some simple examples where we can lose precision.
In the case of BLP, in the next Subsection we propose an extension that will help us to adapt the policy
to a distributed setting.
2.3 Extending BLP
The original formulation of the BLP policy relies on three functions, two of which can be applied to
every subject and one to every object. They can be computed by the Operating System every time an
action is to be executed, to check whether the resulting state will still be secure, and then decide whether
to allow the action or not. Here we propose an extension to their domains to have common signatures,
since in a setting without a central controller we might want to call any of them with any possible entity
of the system without distinguishing between objects and subjects. We also propose a fourth function
which captures information about the past interactions for each entity. Later in the paper we will see that
this latter function can be used to have a form of localised state.
3Read “star property”. In some formulations of the BLP model, this property only consists of the first part because the
ss-property uses fC instead of fS, and then the second part is just a consequence. However, that kind of formulation is again too
restrictive, since a subject cannot perform read operations in levels up to its clearance, but just up to the level it has logged in.
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The types of the three existing functions are then changed to S ∪ O→ L for all of them, and their
definitions are extended in a straighforward way as follows:
∀o ∈ O,s ∈ S : fS(o) = fO(o)∧ fC(o) = fO(o)∧ fO(s) = fS(s)
We call the new function fH since it keeps track of (a part of) the history of the system. When we
apply this function to a particular input subject (resp. object) we should learn what kinds of interactions
the subject (resp. object) has been involved in during the past, therefore the output of the function would
be a kind of current state of the argument subject (resp. object). To capture this notion of state, the
function will not be fixed once and for all, as the original three functions were. Indeed, the output of this
function will be:
• For a particular subject: the least upper bound of the security levels of all the objects read by the
subject so far.
• For a particular object: the least upper bound of the security levels of all the subjects that have
written to the object so far.
Formally, this can be expressed as follows (assuming (B,( fS, fC, fO, fH)) to be some “virtual” global
state that depends on the interactions that have happened and (B′,( fS, fC, fO, f ′H)) the next one):
∀(s,o,a) ∈ B : ( ( (a = read =⇒ fH(s)≥ fO(o)) ∧
(a = write =⇒ fH(o)≥ fC(s)) ) ∧
∀(s′,o′,a′) ∈ B′ : ( f ′H(o′)≥ fH(o)∧ f ′H(s′)≥ fH(s)) )
This means that every time an interaction takes place, changing the state from (B,( fS, fC, fO, fH)) to
some (B′,( fS, fC, fO, f ′H)), the output of f
′
H for some input may be higher than or equal to that of fH . It
can actually be higher depending on the values of the entities read/written, for keeping the resulting least
upper bound we expect to have. Indeed, a very simple result tells us that for every setL :
unionsq(L ) = unionsq{unionsq(L \{a}),a} (∀a ∈L ) (1)
And we should also observe that unionsq( /0) =⊥.
We shall use these four functions to capture this extended version of BLP in a distributed setting.
3 A brief review of Belnap Logic
For granting access according to some security policy, the traditional boolean values (tt and ff) are enough:
tt grants while ff denies access. However, for a distributed setting, where policies might be contradictory
(or not sufficiently informative), those two values might not be enough. We shall consider an extension
to the Boolean Logic proposed by Belnap [3], which has been used for combining security policies [4].
In this extension to the boolean logic, two more values are considered: ⊥ and > (read “bottom” and
“top”). The traditional tt would mean “the policy accepts the interaction” whereas the traditional ff would
mean “the policy does not accept the interaction”. Since different locations might aim at different security
properties, their policies could be contradictory or they may lack information about some particular
interaction. These situations can be represented by the two extra values that we have: ⊥ meaning “no
decision” and > meaning “contradiction” or “conflict”.
With this set of values, which we will call here Four (i.e. Four = {⊥, tt, ff,>}), it is possible to extend
the usual boolean operations (∧ and ∨) and to define new ones (⊗ and ⊕). For obtaining that, the set
Four is equipped with two partial orderings, say ≤k and ≤t , as shown in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: The Belnap bilattice Four: ≤k and ≤t .
The usual boolean ∧ is extended as computing the greatest lower bound in the ≤t lattice, and the
usual ∨ as computing the least upper bound (thereby obtaining the same results as in boolean logic if the
operands belong to {tt, ff}). Analogously, the new operators over Four can be defined as computing the
greatest lower bound (the⊗ operator) and the least upper bound (the⊕ operator), both in the≤k lattice.4
The negation operator ¬ is extended by leaving the two new values unchanged (i.e. ¬⊥ = ⊥ and
¬>=>), and the implication⇒ is extended as follows:
p1⇒ p2 =
{
p2 if p1 ≤k tt
tt otherwise ∀p1, p2 ∈ Four
Another useful operator is the priority >, which returns the first operand unless it is ⊥, in which case it
returns the second operand. This would always consider what the first operand suggests unless it has no
decision, in which case the second operand is considered.
4 Aspect-oriented framework for security
As mentioned, the AspectKB [7] framework allows us to express location-based systems in a process-
calculus-oriented manner. This is achieved by extending the KLAIM [10] coordination [5] language.
These located processes interact with other locations when they try to gather (or put) information from
(or into) them (maybe themselves), which are usually named tuple spaces. The possibility of attaching to
each location (regardless of whether it is a process or a tuple location) some security policy, which will
govern the interactions the location may be involved in, turns the AspectKB language into an aspect-
oriented language. Then, whenever an interaction takes place, the relevant policies are considered by the
semantics to either grant or deny the interaction, using the four-valued Belnap Logic for deciding in a
consistent way.
In this Section, an extension to that framework is made, mixing all process locations and tuple loca-
tions into just entity locations, and attaching to them more aspects than just the security policies. The
extra information attached to each location refers to security levels in the sense of a multilevel security
policy. Moreover, the mechanisms of the language explicitly keep track of some information (at a certain
level of abstraction) regarding the interactions that have taken place, giving the flavour of a localised
4Notice that this could also be done by just extending the “truth tables” of the usual boolean operators and defining new
ones for the new operators. That would mean, however, having not just 2 truth tables with 4 cells each (as in Boolean Logic)
but 4 truth tables with 16 cells each, making it difficult to remember what each operator produces.
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N ∈ Net N ::= N1 || N2 | l ::w P | l ::w 〈−→l 〉
P ∈ Proc P ::= P1 | P2 | ∑i ai.Pi | ∗P
a ∈ Act a ::= out(−→`)@` | in(
−→
`λ )@` | read(
−→
`λ )@`
`,`λ ∈ Loc ` ::= u | l `λ ::= ` | !u
w ∈ Annot w ::= < lst, pol >
lst ∈ LocSt lst ::= < γS,γC,γH ,γO >
γ ∈ L le f t implicit
Table 1: AspectKB+ Syntax – Nets, Processes, Actions and States.
state, which the semantics of the language keep updated5.
Besides this, one can write Aspects using the extra information, which is basically the output of
the functions mentioned in Subsection 2.3 (considering that every entity location can be either a subject
and/or an object in the whole system, so every location can be a potential input to all those functions).
Then, this will allow us to capture, among others, the BLP policies without losing precision.
Following this informal introduction to our extension, which we shall call AspectKB+ due to its
enhanced features, we shall present its formalities.
4.1 Syntax and Semantics
Syntax. The syntax of the AspectKB+ language is given in Tables 1 and 2. Table 1 gives the syntax for
nets, the basic modules that can be described in the language. A net is a parallel composition of located
processes and/or located tuples (data), together with an annotation explained below. Each process can be
a parallel composition of processes, a non-deterministic choice between processes following an action,
or a replicated process. A process not performing any action shall be written 0. The allowed actions are
reading from a location (in and read, resp. with or without deleting the data read) or writing to it (out).
Every location has an annotation w, whose first part (lst) is intended to keep track of the interactions
that the location has been involved in. This localised state consists of 4 pieces of information (namely
γS,γC,γH , and γO) that are elements of the lattice L of security levels (introduced in Subsection 2.1).
Since every location can be input to the four functions fS, fC, fH and fO, and since the result of evaluating
them is in L, we can keep attached to each location the result of evaluating each of those four functions.
The second part (pol) of the annotation in every location is the actual security policy governing the
location, which has to be expressed using the syntax of Table 2. The policy can be a Belnap combination
of policies, a boolean value, or a single aspect. This latter consists of a cut (the action, together with
its continuation, to be trapped by the aspect), a condition cond (a boolean applicability condition) and a
recommendation rec (a four-valued Belnap Logic advice for the aspect). To define an aspect, one may
refer to the security levels stored in the trapped interaction or to a single value from the lattice L. To do
the former, one can write an aspect naming some of the five syntactic names (Ss,Cs,Hs,Ot ,Ht) specified
in the category v ∈ Lev, which will later be matched by the semantics to the specific values kept in the
trapped interaction. To do the latter, one can write an aspect providing a specific value from L, as the
category v ∈ Lev permits (by having γ among its choices). Finally, the occurs-in operator, which can be
easily defined in a compositional way, checks whether the action occurs in the continuation process.
5As one can argue, having information inside the locations, namely the tuples, also gives us the flavour of state, yet that is
information that changes according to what processes do, so we cannot rely on that information for guaranteeing any property.
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pol ∈ Pol pol ::= asp | ¬pol | pol⊕ pol | pol⊗ pol | pol⇒ pol |
pol > pol | pol∧ pol | pol∨ pol | true | false
asp ∈ Asp asp ::= [rec if cut : cond]
cut ∈ Cut cut ::= ` :: at .X
at ∈ Actt at ::= out(−→`t )@` | in(
−→
`tλ )@` | read(
−→
`tλ )@`
rec ∈ Rec rec ::= `1 = `2 | ¬rec | rec⊕ rec | rec⊗ rec | rec∧ rec | rec∨ rec |
rec⇒ rec | true | false | a occurs-in X | v1 ≥ v2
cond ∈ Cond cond ::= `1 = `2 | ¬cond | cond1∧ cond2 | cond1∨ cond2 |
true | false | a occurs-in X
v ∈ Lev v ::= Ss |Cs | Hs | Ot | Ht | γ
`t ::= ` | `tλ ::= ` |
Table 2: AspectKB+ Syntax - Aspects for Security Policies.
Semantics. The semantics is given by a one-step reduction relation. It makes use of a structural con-
gruence on nets (defined in Table 4), and also of an operation match, for matching input patterns to actual
data, which could easily be defined in an inductive way by the structure of its arguments.
The reaction rules (defined in Table 3) prescribe how the system may evolve in the presence of some
process location and some target location.
In the “where” lines of each rule, the boolean condition b is obtained by evaluating the security
policies of the locations involved in the computation using the evaluation function [[.]] (formally defined
in Subsection 4.2). This is done to either allow or disallow the process to compute, and for this it
also makes use of the function grant (also formally defined in Subsection 4.2) for turning four-valued
Belnap truth values into boolean truth values. If the action was disallowed the involved process simply
terminates, thereby becoming just a 0; otherwise the process evolves as the next paragraphs explain.
In the case of a read or in action, the process location ls is subject to a substitution, using the result
of the matching done with the match operation. Moreover, the localised state of that location might be
modified, changing the historic component of its annotation by the least upper bound of the previous
value and the security level of the target location lt . This follows the suggestion of Equation (1).
In the case of an out action, the data is stored in the target location. However, this is not done directly,
but actually another “virtual” location is created, with a special localised state. This is intended to permit
the virtual location holding the pre-existing process Q to keep running as it was, without being interfered
with. The virtual location now holding the data has an historic component on the annotation that is the
least upper bound of the previous value in the location lt and the security level of the process location ls
that has written the data. Of course it is possible that the value is the same as in the original lt .
To simulate the log-in of a subject in a lower level than its clearance, a process can be annotated with
a value for γC lower that the γS. This value will then never change, just as the γS and γO components of
the localised state. Note also that the security policy annotating each location never changes either.
4.2 Meaning of policies and granting access
In the “where” lines of each semantic rule there is a check that tells whether the interaction should be
allowed. For this purpose, the policies of both locations taking part in the interaction are combined using
the Belnap operator⊕, and the result of the evaluation by the operator [[.]] is passed to the function grant.
The function grant is defined by grant(p) = p ≤k tt, for all p in Four. The aim of granting access
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N1→ N′1
N1 || N2→ N′1 || N2
N ≡M M→M′ M′ ≡ N′
N→ N′
(ls ::ws read(
−→
`λ )@lt .P+ · · ·) || (lt ::wt 〈−→l 〉)
→
{
ls ::w
′
s Pθ || lt ::wt 〈−→l 〉 if b ∧ match(
−→
`λ ;
−→
l ) = θ
ls ::ws 0 || lt ::wt 〈−→l 〉 if ¬b
where wδ =<< γSδ ,γ
C
δ ,γ
H
δ ,γ
O
δ >, polδ >, (δ ∈ {s, t});
and where b = grant([[pols⊕ polt ]](ls :: read(
−→
`λ )@lt .P,< γSs ,γCs ,γOt ,γHs ,γHt >));
and where w′s =<< γSs ,γCs ,(γHs unionsq (γOt unionsq γHt )),γOs >, pols > .
(ls ::ws in(
−→
`λ )@lt .P+ · · ·) || (lt ::wt 〈−→l 〉)
→
{
ls ::w
′
s Pθ if b ∧ match(
−→
`λ ;
−→
l ) = θ
ls ::ws 0 || lt ::wt 〈−→l 〉 if ¬b
where wδ =<< γSδ ,γ
C
δ ,γ
H
δ ,γ
O
δ >, polδ >, (δ ∈ {s, t});
and where b = grant([[pols⊕ polt ]](ls :: in(
−→
`λ )@lt .P,< γSs ,γCs ,γOt ,γHs ,γHt >));
and where w′s =<< γSs ,γCs ,(γHs unionsq (γOt unionsq γHt )),γOs >, pols > .
(ls ::ws out(
−→
l )@lt .P+ · · ·) || (lt ::wt Q)
→
{
ls ::ws P || lt ::w′t 〈−→l 〉 || lt ::wt Q if b
ls ::ws 0 || lt ::wt Q if ¬b
where wδ =<< γSδ ,γ
C
δ ,γ
H
δ ,γ
O
δ >, polδ >, (δ ∈ {s, t});
and where b = grant([[pols⊕ polt ]](ls :: out(−→l )@lt .P,< γSs ,γCs ,γOt ,γHs ,γHt >));
and where w′t =<< γSt ,γCt ,(γHt unionsq (γCs unionsq γHs )),γOt >, polt > .
Table 3: Reaction Semantics of AspectKB+ .
whenever the result is less than or equal to tt is for doing so not only if both policies agree with this, but
also if some of the policies lack some decision, because this would mean that it does not actually forbid
the interaction. This is related to the use of ⊕ for combining the policies, and the aim is that whenever
the policies are contradictory, the result of the evaluation by [[.]] gives >∈ Four, thereby denying access
as long as at least one policy has evidence that the interaction should be disallowed6.
The evaluation function [[.]] (Table 5) is defined inductively on the structure of the (infix) policy.
The base cases are when the policy is just a constant (true or false) and when it is just an aspect (i.e. it
belongs to Asp). In this latter case, the first (postfix) parameter, a specific action with continuation, is
checked against the cut of the aspect, a generic action with continuation, using the function check, which
could easily be defined in an inductive way by the structure of its arguments. This is achieved using a
function extract, which produces the list of literals that occur in an action with continuation in a way that,
for instance, extract(` :: out(`t1, · · · , `tn)@`′.X) = [`,out, `t1, · · · , `tn, `′,X ], which is done by just pattern
matching the components of the given parameter and then pushing them into a list. The function check
determines whether there is a substitution θ that can be performed in the cut that matches the parameter
given to the [[.]]. This is needed because the cut can possibly consist of variables for representing the
locations and even the arguments of the action in the cut may not be specified. If there is such θ , the rec
6This follows a conservative principle, as to actually grant access there should not be any policy at all denying the interaction.
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l ::w P1 | P2 ≡ l ::w P1 || l ::w P2
l ::w ∗P ≡ l ::w P | ∗P
l ::w P ≡ l ::w P || l ::w 0
N1 ≡ N2
N || N1 ≡ N || N2
Table 4: Structural Congruence.
[[[rec if cut : cond]]](l :: a .P,< γS,γC,γO,γHs,γHt >) =
case check(extract(cut) ; extract(l :: a .P)) of
fail : ⊥
θ :
{
[((rec θ)θ ′)] if [(cond θ)]
⊥ if ¬[(cond θ)]
where θ ′ = [γS/Ss,γC/Cs,γO/Ot ,γHs/Hs,γHt/Ht ]

[[¬pol]](N,Γ) = ¬([[pol]](N,Γ))
[[pol1 φ pol2]](N,Γ) = ([[pol1]](N,Γ)) φ ([[pol2]](N,Γ)), (φ ∈ {⊕,⊗,⇒,>,∧,∨})
[[true]](N,Γ) = tt
[[false]](N,Γ) = ff
Table 5: Meaning of Policies in Pol for AspectKB+.
and the cond are substituted using it to determine the result. This is achieved using the usual two-valued
meaning [(cond)], which could be straightforwardly adapted to a four-valued meaning [(rec)].
Due to the semantics of Table 3, the first parameter will always be the actual action taking place.
The second (postfix) parameter (consisting of five values in the lattice L) is used to produce another
special substitution (θ ′) that is also used (together with θ ) to determine the result of the recommendation
rec. Due to the semantics of Table 3, the security levels annotated in the actual interacting locations
are given here. Indeed, those taken from the target location are the ones identifying the classification
(γOt ) of the location and the historic annotation (γHt ). Those taken from the process location are the ones
identifying the clearance (γSs ) and the current level (γCs ) of the location and the historic annotation (γHs ).
It should be noticed that, while the θ substitutes according to some checking performed between the
cut and the first parameter (the actual action), the θ ′ substitutes according to the five syntactic names
prescribed by the syntax of Table 2, in the v ∈ Lev meta-variable. Therefore, when describing a system
in AspectKB+, these syntactic names could be used to describe recommendations (rec) that will later be
used to check actual security levels of the interacting locations, as already pointed in Subsection 4.1.
4.3 Capturing BLP in AspectKB+
Having developed our formal framework, we shall show how the extended BLP policy of Subsection 2.3
can be elegantly captured. We shall also show that we can easily decide which cases of the example in
Subsection 1.1 are secure and which are not, without losing any precision, unlike the information-flow
approach.
Remember that AspectKB+ is a process calculus, and even though in the original formulation of BLP
the compliance of a state with the policy is checked in every state, we can just check if a transition might
take us to an “insecure state”. Also remember that AspectKB+ provides us with the possibility, when
describing aspects, of writing in the recommendation rec the five syntactic names we have mentioned,
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which later will be substituted by the evaluation function [[.]]. So basically using those distinctive names
we aim to capture the BLP policy.
The first aspects. Let us focus first on the ss-property, which prescribes that a subject cannot read
an object that has higher security level than itself. The operations that can read information from other
locations are the read and the in actions. So the aspects that capture the ss-property are the following:[
Ss ≥ Ot if ls :: read(−)@lt .P : true
]
(2)
[
Ss ≥ Ot if ls :: in(−)@lt .P : true
]
(3)
Note that each aspect is trapping a particular operation, without caring about the parameters and with a
trivial applicability condition. Whenever some of these aspects trap an action, the recommendation will
be considered, granting access only if the security level of the subject is not lower than that of the object,
since the two names Ss and Ot will then be replaced by the corresponding security levels of the actual
interacting locations, thanks to Tables 3 and 5.
For the ?-property.1, which prescribes that a subject cannot write any object that has lower security
level than the level the subject is currently in, we have to follow a similar approach. Considering that
the write operations are the out and the in (since deleting data is a form of write, because some implicit
information could be communicated), the aspects are as follows:[
Ot ≥Cs if ls :: out(−)@lt .P : true
]
(4)
[
Ot ≥Cs if ls :: in(−)@lt .P : true
]
(5)
Whenever some of these aspects trap an action, the recommendation will only grant access if the security
level of the object is not lower than the one the subject is currently in (note the use of Cs instead of Ss).
The ?-property.2. Now let us consider the ?-property.2, which was basically the one that initiated the
proposal made in this paper, due to the difficulty of capturing it precisely in a distributed setting. Note
that the semantics of AspectKB+ will keep track of the least upper bound of the security levels of the
objects read by a particular subject location, because it updates it whenever the subject reads something
that is not lower than the current value. A similar observation can be done for the object locations.
Let us consider a subject location, which might have read some high information as long as its
security level allows it (otherwise either aspect (2) or (3) would have denied it). Any subsequent write
to a low location must be denied, and in principle either aspect (4) or (5) might decide this, unless the
subject is logged into the system with a low security level. In any case, using the localised state that
we have in the subject location, and making use of the Hs syntactic name provided by the syntax for
expressing aspects, we define the following aspects:[
Ot ≥ Hs if ls :: out(−)@lt .P : true
]
(6)
[
Ot ≥ Hs if ls :: in(−)@lt .P : true
]
(7)
They can be understood in a very similar way as aspects (4) and (5), with the difference being that
they are considering the localised state of the subject location, instead of the level where the subject has
logged into the system.
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Analogous considerations can be done for an object location, and we can define the following aspects
for finishing to capture the whole BLP policy:[
Ss ≥ Ht if ls :: read(−)@lt .P : true
]
(8)
[
Ss ≥ Ht if ls :: in(−)@lt .P : true
]
(9)
Combining the aspects. After defining these eight aspects, the idea is to combine and attach them to
every location, so every time an interaction is to take place, the semantics will consider all the aspects
before allowing the interaction to happen.
Since the BLP model says that a state is secure if both properties are satisfied, then we need to make
sure that none of the aspects representing the properties detects a possible insecure interaction, as that
would mean that at least one of the properties is not satisfied. For capturing this situation, again the
Belnap operator that must be used to combine the aspects for attaching them to the locations is ⊕.
Now we are ready to state our first Lemma:
Lemma 4.1 If a distributed system is insecure in the sense of Section 2.3, then some of the aspects from
(2) to (9) will deny the insecure interaction.
For the converse we need to make an extra observation, discussed in the following Sub-subsection.
4.3.1 Initialising the historic value
The aspects just defined will check, among other values, the historic component γH attached to each loca-
tion, and that value will be kept updated by the semantics. But, initially, one must give a particular value
for the component. The chosen value will not affect the correctness of the aspects detecting insecure
interactions, but to fulfil our requirement that we should not lose any precision while doing so (unlike
the information-flow approach) the value should be ⊥ ∈ L. This follows the suggestion of Equation (1)
and the observation just after it. Now we are ready to state our the converse of the previous Lemma:
Lemma 4.2 If some of the aspects from (2) to (9) deny an interaction, then the hypothetical resulting
global state, if the interaction was actually allowed, is insecure in the sense of Section 2.3.
Furthermore, we can now easily verify that the three examples of Figure 1 are precisely captured.
In particular, it should be taken into account what could happen after the process in location E writes to
location D (Figure 1c). For the process in D to be actually influenced by this, it must explicitly read the
data, since the semantics of AspectKB+ will put it in another “virtual” location, with a higher historic
component. So if the process is influenced, then at t3 the aspects (actually aspect (6)) will prevent the
write to C, otherwise the write will be allowed.
4.4 A very simple example
Let us now consider a very simple example to show how to combine looking to the future and to the
past. Assume an airline has a database where information about the passengers is kept. The historic
component of the database location is initialised to ⊥ ∈ L so any process could read from it, but after
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some data is written, only some processes could do so, according to the security level of the data written.
The aspect that prescribes this is:[
clearanceu ≥ historyAirlineDB
if u :: read(pass,−)@AirlineDB.P : true
]
(10)
As one can notice, this is a special case of aspect (8), but it is written like this here to emphasise the
example.
One of the process locations that will not be allowed to read data from the database due to the previous
aspect is the Government, whose clearance should not be enough to satisfy the rec of the aspect. Indeed,
the historic component of the database should be high enough since the data written in there might be
sensitive for the passengers.
However, in times of heightened security due to probable threats, the Government should be able
to audit the passengers, therefore allowing it to read the database is necessary. Anyway, this should
be allowed as long as the Government will not, later, give the passengers’ data to the Press, to keep
satisfying the right to privacy of the passengers. The following aspect prescribes this:[ ¬(out(data)@PressRelease occurs-in P)
if Government :: read(pass,data)@AirlineDB.P : test(threatlevel,high)@AirlineDB
]
(11)
This is just a little aspect that looks to the future7, where we see how this is achieved. In the presence
of this aspect, the Government will be allowed to perform the read action, as long as there is a tuple
< threatlevel,high > in the Airline database (i.e. the Airline was already notified of the heightened
security situation), and also as long as the Government process trying to read the data will not leak the
data to the Press in the future.
But one of the conditions is set in the cond of the aspect whereas the other in the rec. The reason is
related to the fact that this aspect is a temporary one, and the aim is to combine it with the previous one.
Moreover, the combination should be done in a way that the Government should actually be allowed to
read the database, although the pre-existing aspect (aspect (10)) might deny this. Therefore, the operator
needed for combining the two aspects is the priority>, and then the whole security policy for the Airline
database would be (11) > (10)8.
With that, if the process location is the Government and the heightened security situation is declared,
then aspect (11) will be considered. Otherwise, either the action will not be trapped by the aspect (if the
process location is not the Government) or the condition cond will be ff (if the threat level is not high),
resulting in both cases in a ⊥ ∈ Four for aspect (11), considering then the aspect (10).
This example, even though it is very simple, clearly shows three features of our framework:
• The use of Aspects for security allows us to temporarily modify a distributed system without
having to dig into the bussiness logic of the processes.
• The use of the four-valued Belnap Logic allows us to easily combine policies, providing flexibility
for the aspect-oriented framework.
• The combination of looking to the past and to the future provides even more flexibility, giving the
power to express exactly what is intended, for precisely satisfying some properties.
7In [12] there are many more realistic examples that look to the future, in the Electronic Health Records domain.
8Note that using this policy with the priority, the aspect (11) could even remain there, instead of just being a temporary
one, since it will be ignored in most of the cases, as long as the tuple < threatlevel,high > is removed after the situation is
normalised.
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While the first two features where already present in the AspectKB framework (and in particular the
first one is widely used in the aspect-orientation community), the third one is a very powerful add-on
provided by the new AspectKB+ framework.
5 Conclusion
We have studied the problem of enforcing multilevel security in a distributed system as precisely as
possible. An information-flow approach poses the problem of having to “guess” what processes in other
locations may do, thereby losing some precision. Therefore, we have extended an existing framework to
deal with a notion of localised state, which has given us the power to access information about the past
performance of the system, thereby allowing us to capture the Bell-LaPadula policy with precision.
The resulting framework provides a way to combine policies that look to both the future and the past
due to the four-valued Belnap Logic. This gives flexibility to the framework, by capturing precisely what
is intended by the security policies. This also gives more power than the previous framework of [7].
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